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I.  What „Economics“ for Institutional Research?
There are many different types of “economics” today. For the purpose at hand
1 it is useful to
distinguish four versions:
-  Standard Neoclassical Economics which the world over is the dominant paradigm. It
assumes a homo oeconomicus selfishly and rationally maximizing utility under given
exogenous and unchanging preferences with an unlimited calculating facility and no
emotions (see Kirchgässner 2008);
-  Socio-Economics or Social Economics whose crucial elements (as described by Davis
and Dolfsma 2008) are an emphasis on social values (in particular ethics, equity,
power, human dignity) and social relationships (in particular embeddedness);
-  New Institutional Economics represented by agency, transaction costs, and property
rights theory; and
-  Psychological Economics (often called Behavioural Economics
2) which widens the
neoclassical homo oeconomicus by considering insights gained from psychology (and
sometimes sociology).
The present author considers himself a (benevolent) outsider to Social Economics. Actually,
he is one of the “New Social Economists” (Davis and Dolfsma 2008:4-5) or, less nicely,
“Economic Imperialists” who finds it fruitful to apply (neoclassical) economic thinking to the
environment, politics, history, the arts, terrorism and happiness. At the same time he strongly
believes that the standard homo oeconomicus needs to be improved by considering institutions
and psychological and sociological insights.
This paper advances two arguments:
-  An extension of Neoclassical Economics with elements from other social sciences
(including political science, sociology, psychology, law and anthropology) is fruitful
to explain institutions because it allows us to maintain the strength of that approach:
                                                   
1 The guest editors specifically requested me (and probably other contributors) to analyze the
question „Is economics adequate to explain institutions?“ on the background of the Elgar
Companion in Social Economics (Davis and Dolfsma 2008).
2 E.g. in Maital, ed. (2007). This is a misnomer, as economics (including Neoclassics) has
always dealt with human behaviour, and the term “behavioural” reminds of “behaviouristic”
(a la Skinner 1974) which is certainly not what is meant when scholars refer to behavioural
economics. See also Simon (1985) for similar misgivings about the unfortunate term.3
Neoclassics is based on clear concepts, strives to be as simple as possible, and makes
an effort to derive theoretical hypotheses and to test them with empirical data from the
field, natural and laboratory experiments. I find the assumption of exogenous and
unchanging preferences to be good to discipline one’s thinking – as long as one is
prepared to deviate from it when needed.
-  Social Economics can play an important role helping to overcome the limitations of
Neoclassics when dealing with institutions. However, I wish to argue that Social
Economics should change in order to be able to fulfil this role: it should become more
concrete, integrate what is useful in Neoclassics, and should seriously engage in
empirical research.
These arguments make clear that my position differs from Social Economics (as represented
by most authors in the Compendium) which endeavours to go far beyond what is argued
above. In particular, most Social Economists take Neoclassics to be a basically wrong view of
the world, therefore want to discard it completely and endeavour to start from a radically
“social” position
3.
II.  Explaining Institution
There are many different meanings of what an “institution” is. Not surprisingly, due to their
very broad outlook, there are many different understandings among Social Economists (see
e.g. Mayhew 2008, Bush 2008, Altman 2008, Hodgson 2008 in the Compendium). In standard
economics institutions normally refer to the rules of the game reflected in specific agency
relationships, transaction costs, and property rights. In order to be as concrete as possible (and
therewith expose myself to criticism) I choose two quite different institutions in the form of
organizations: the government (section III) and art venues (section IV). Due to the strict word
limit imposed by the guest editors, it is of course impossible to provide an extensive account
of how I think Neoclassical and Social Economics could help us to better understand these
particular institutions. I can only sketch what aspects I consider well analyzed by Neoclassics,
where the major shortcomings are, and where Social Economics has much to contribute.
III.  Government
                                                   
3 In the Compendium, writers such as Mayhew 2008, Altman 2008, Carvalho and Rodrigues
2008 or Bardhan and Ray 2008 might be associated with this view.4
Public Choice, or the New Political Economy, is firmly grounded in Neoclassics
4. Most
importantly, the assumption that politicians are benevolent individuals is rejected. Instead
they are taken to have the same selfish motives as all other individuals. The most important
goal of all politicians is to stay in, or to come into, power which in a democracy means to be
(re-)elected. The same selfish motives are taken to apply to public officials, in that literature
normally called bureaucrats (e.g. Niskanen 1971, Wintrobe 1996). This approach allowed
Public Choice scholars to reach original and relevant results. I want to illustrate this claim by
discussing Politico-Economic Models and an extension of federalism by the creation of new
kinds of governmental units.
Politico-Economic Models
Politico-economic models
5 seek to theoretically and empirically capture the interdependence
between the economy and the polity for the institution of representative democracy.  The state
of the economy, represented by per capita income, the rate of unemployment and the rate of
inflation, systematically affects the popularity of the government as well as re-election. The
politicians in power are well aware of this influence and in turn use the policy instruments at
their disposal, in particular government expenditures and regulations, to affect the state of the
economy. This interaction produces regular economic fluctuations within election periods, in
most countries four years. This is noteworthy, as traditionally economics scholars assumed
that governments want to reduce business cycles. Economists rooted in Keynesian thinking
took it as evident that once politicians know how to effectively combat business fluctuations,
they will indeed do it.
The business cycles produced in dictatorships are different. The persons or groups in power
are little or not at all constrained by elections; the main danger of being toppled comes from
the military and possibly other organized groups whose interests have therefore to be taken
into account. Only rarely an uprising of the population is able to remove a dictator – as long
as it is not supported by the military. A successful dictator therefore does not need to react
much to the grievances of the population but has to make sure that the military keep
supporting him. This is best done by a policy making it clear to the military that they run a
                                                   
4 This is clearly visible in the authoritative surveys by Mueller 1997, 2003. As always, there
are exceptions, such as Olson (1969), and most clearly Hirschman (1970, 1993). Recently,
political economists such as Persson and Tabellini (2003) have, if anything, moved the field
even more towards strict Neoclassics.
5 See e.g. the collection of articles in Frey 19975
great and deadly risk if they oppose the dictator. At the same time the dictator must offer them
benefits making it attractive for them to keep supporting the dictator.
Politico-economic models have also been applied to the institution of direct democracy. In
such a democracy (of which Switzerland is a living example) the politicians in power are
almost always re-elected – but they nevertheless have little power because the important
political issues are decided by referendum. The politicians’ main task is to win such referenda
by arguing with the population about the merits of a proposition, and also to keep the voters
satisfied with the economic conditions.
The sketch of the politico-economic interactions in the three different governmental
institutions shows the strength of a neoclassical analysis focused on the effects of incentives
provided by different institutional settings. Clear and empirically testable propositions are
advanced helping us to understand how institutions function. But Neoclassical Public Choice
certainly does not provide a full account of how political institutions work. The personality of
politicians (such as their “leadership” quality), the social relationships between them and
other decision-makers (such as in an “old boys network”, and more generally their
embeddedness), cultural differences, and their ethical standards also matter. Social Economics
rightly points out that such aspects are crucial to explain how politicians behave, in particular
for politicians with a great “aura” such as Gandhi, Kennedy, Thatcher, Mandela or Obama. It
may well be argued that such politicians do not enter politics to enjoy power but rather
because they want to put their ideas into reality. But it is also clear that even such
extraordinary politicians are bound by the need to be elected and re-elected. It would greatly
add to our knowledge of political institutions if Social Economists not only stated the
importance of such aspects but would also advance theoretical propositions open to empirical
tests.
Reorganizing the State by New Federal Units
The question to what extent “economics is adequate to explain institutions” can also be
discussed with respect to normative proposals of how to organize government (rather than the
positive analysis as in the case of politico-economic models). An important topic is how
centralized and decentralized a state should be. Neoclassical public finance (“Public
Economics”) has extensively discussed the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization;
the arguments need not be repeated here (see e.g. Inman and Rubinfeld 1997). But it has made
an important, and often only implicit, assumption, namely that each level of government (i.e.6
the central state, the provinces and the communes) have exclusive authority over particular
governmental functions.
A new approach
6 proposes quite different federal units having four essential characteristics.
The new federal units are called FOCJ in accordance to the four constituting elements:
Functional  (F), i.e. the new political units extend over areas defined by the tasks to be
fulfilled; Overlapping (O), i.e. in line with the many different tasks (functions) there are
corresponding governmental units extending over different geographical areas; Competing
(C), i.e. individuals and/or communities may choose to which governmental unit they want to
belong, and they have political rights to express their preferences directly via initiatives and
referenda; Jurisdictions (J), i.e. the units established are governmental, they have enforcement
power and can, in particular, levy taxes.
The neoclassical economic theory of federalism analyzes the behaviour of given political
units at the different levels of government. It takes in this sense the governmental institutions
to be given. In contrast, FOCJ emerge in response to the 'geography of problems'. The size of
the jurisdictions is adapted to the problems existing and the governmental institutions become
endogenous.
The four elements of FOCJ are now discussed in some more detail.
Functions
A particular public service benefiting people living in a certain geographical area should also
be financed by them, i.e. there should be no spill-overs. The various governmental units
providing for different functions can cater for regional differences in the populations'
preferences or, more precisely, to its demands. To minimize cost, these units have to exploit
economies of scale in production. As the latter may strongly differ between functions (e.g.,
between schools, police, hospitals, power plants and defence), there is an additional reason for
uni-functional (or few-functional) governmental units of different sizes, i.e. for “fiscal
equivalence” (Olson 1969, Oates 1972). That the size of governmental units is endogenous
constitutes an essential part of FOCJ.
                                                   
6 Similar ideas can already be found in Montesquieu (1749) and much later in Burnheim
(1985). Tullock (1994) pioneered a similar concept. Casella and Frey (1992), Frey and
Eichenberger (1999). Vanberg (2000), and Kyriacou (2006) discuss and apply the concept and
refer to further literature.7
Overlaps
FOCJ may overlap in two respects: (a) FOCJ catering to different functions may overlap; (b)
two or more FOCJ catering even for the same function may geographically intersect (e.g., a
multitude of school FOCJ may exist in the same geographical area). An individual or a
political community normally belongs to various FOCJ at the same time. FOCJ need not be
physically contiguous, and they need not have a monopoly over a certain area of land. This
concept completely differs from archaic nationalism with its fighting over pieces of land. It
also breaks with the notion of neoclassical public finance that units at the same level should
not overlap.
Competition
The heads of FOCJ are induced to conform closely to their members' preferences by two
mechanisms:  (a)  individuals'  and  communities'  can  exit  imitating  market  competition
(Hirschman 1970). Migration is only one means of exit; often, membership in a particular
FOCUS (as the singular of FOCJ might be called) can be discontinued without changing one's
location. (b) Individuals have voting rights establishing political competition.
For FOCJ to establish competition between governments, exit should be as unrestrained as
possible. In contrast, entry need not necessarily be free. Jurisdictions and individuals may be
asked to pay a price if they want to join a particular FOCUS and benefit from its public
goods. The existing members of the particular FOCUS have to democratically decide whether
a new member pays an adequate entry price and is thus welcome.
Jurisdictions
A FOCUS is a democratic governmental unit with authority over its citizens, including the
power to tax. According to the two types of overlap distinguished above, there are two forms
of membership: (i) The individuals living in a community become citizens of the FOCJ to
which their community belongs. In that case, an individual can only exit via mobility. (ii)
Individuals may choose freely whether they want to belong to a particular FOCUS, but then
are subject to its authority and must pay the corresponding taxes. Some FOCJ may be non-
voluntary in the sense that the central government may regulate that everyone must belong to
some FOCUS providing for a certain function, e.g., to a school-FOCUS, and must pay the
corresponding taxes (an analogy here is health insurance, which in many countries is
obligatory but where individuals are allowed to choose an insurance company).8
FOCJ compare favourably with traditional forms of federalism. The governments have
stronger incentives and possibilities to satisfy the heterogeneous preferences of individuals.
Due to the concentration on one functional area, the citizens of a particular FOCUS are better
informed about its activity, and are in a better position to compare its performance to other
governments. As many benefits and costs extend over a quite limited geographic area, FOCJ
are often small. The exit option opened by the existence of overlapping jurisdictions is also an
important means to make one's preferences known to governmental suppliers.
FOCJ are able to provide public services at low cost because they are formed in order to
minimize inter-jurisdictional spill-overs and to exploit economies of scale. When the benefits
of a specific activity indivisibly extend over large areas, and there are decreasing costs, the
corresponding optimal FOCUS may cover many communities, several nations, or even
continents. The threat of dissatisfied citizens or communities to exit a FOCUS provides
governments with an incentive to take individual preferences into account and to provide the
public services efficiently. FOCJ undermine the politicians' cartel (the formation of a self-
serving “classe politique”) to competent outsiders. While all-purpose jurisdictions attract
persons with broad and non-specialized knowledge to become politicians, in FOCJ, persons
with a well-grounded knowledge in a particular functional area (say education or water
provision) are successful.
A federal web composed of FOCJ affects the role of the nation states. They lose functions
they presently do not fulfil according to the population's preferences, or which they produce at
higher cost than FOCJ. On the other hand, the scheme does not purport to do away with
nations but allows for multi-national as well as small-scale alternatives where citizens desire
them. Nation states subsist in so far as they provide functions efficiently according to the
voters' preferences.
Up to this point the advantages of FOCJ have been emphasized. The proposal may also have
major disadvantages relating to issues of major concern to Social Economics.
- Citizens may be physically and cognitively overburdened. In a federal system of FOCJ,
each individual is a citizen of various jurisdictions. As a consequence, individuals may
be overburdened by voting in elections and referenda taking place in each FOCUS. At
the same time, each individual is confronted with a multitude of suppliers of public
services making life difficult. This may create ethical issues and may be incompatible
with human dignity.9
-  Income distribution may become more unequal. All forms of federalism - including
FOCJ – tend to undermine the possibility to establish a fairer distribution of income.
Moreover, FOCJ may provide an opportunity of people sorting according to social
classes strengthening differences in income and power and leading to inequity.
- Citizens may loose their sense of belonging. In traditional federalism an individual
belongs to one particular unit at each level: one is a citizen of commune X, in province
Y, in state Z. In contrast, with FOCJ, a citizen belongs at the same time to many
different political units which moreover are overlapping. This raises the question
whether FOCJ sufficiently care for people’s desire for embeddedness.
The idea of FOCJ may be attractive to Social Economists because this new type of
federalism overcomes nationalism and allows a dynamic adaptation to new problems. On
the other hand, it needs to be seriously analyzed to what extent social values such as
ethics, equity, power and human dignity, and social relationships such as embeddedness
may flourish under this new concept of federalism, and whether it constitutes an advance
over traditional federalism. There is thus a wide scope for a fruitful application of Social
Economics.
IV.  Cultural Venues
The second institution to be discussed has quite different features from the governmental
institutions discussed in the previous section. Cultural venues are institutions catering to
people’s preferences for artistic experiences. In order to discuss again as concretely as
possible how the various types of economics may deal with institutions, a particular topic
is chosen: how various  institutional  types  of  museums affect the supply of artistic
activities. It will again be apparent where the limits of Neoclassics are and where Social
Economics may play an important part.
There  is  an  extensive  neoclassical  analysis  applied  to  culture  and  the  arts,  called
“Economics of the Arts” or “Cultural Economics”
7. The managers of museums are
assumed to be primarily concerned with their own interests. The directors’ utility depends
on their own income and the prestige they receive within their reference group, which
consists mainly of art lovers and the international museum community. A second source
of utility is derived from agreeable working conditions and job security. But museum
                                                   
7 A survey article is provided by Throsby (1994). Books are Baumol and Bowen (1966),
Peacock (1993), Benhamou (2000), Throsby (2001), Frey and Pommerehne (1989), Frey
(2004) and the collection of articles in Peacock (1998), Rizzo and Towse (2002), Towse
(2003), Ginsburgh and Throsby (2006) and Hutter and Throsby (2008).10
managers are not free to simply pursue their own goals, because they face constraints on
their actions. Differences in these institutionally determined restrictions explain the
museum  management’s  behaviour.  The  finances  available  are  the  most  important
constraint on the museum’s management. Other constraints, such as limited space or legal
and administrative burdens imposed by the bureaucracy or labour unions, can also weigh
heavily.
The source of income differs considerably between museums. Some depend mostly on
public grants, others rely exclusively on private money (donations and sponsorship, or
income generated from entrance fees, shops and restaurants). In the following, three types
of museums are distinguished: public, private and museums dependent on donations.
Public Museums
Directors of public  museums rely on public grants. The government allocates them
sufficient funds to cover the expenses considered necessary for fulfilling their tasks.
While they are expected to keep within the budget, if a deficit occurs, it will be covered
by the public purse. This institutional setting provides little incentive to generate
additional income and to keep costs at a minimum. The directorate will not allocate
energy and resources generating additional income, because any additional money goes
back to the national treasury acting like an implicit tax of 100 percent on profits.
The museum managers therefore are free to emphasise non-commercial aspects. It can
legitimise its activities by referring to intrinsic ‘artistic’, “cultural”, or ‘scientific’ values.
This helps the museum directors to achieve their goals of gaining prestige in the museum
world, enables highly rated exhibitions, and allows for pleasant working conditions.
From this institutional point of view, one would expect that:
-  Public museums do not sell any paintings from their art collection because the
income generated would be lost for them as it has to go to the treasury. Moreover,
the museum activities become measurable in monetary units, which opens the
museum managers to criticism from the outside (be it by politicians or public
administrators).
-  Exhibitions tend to be designed to please an insider group of art connoisseurs,
including in particular other museum directors.
-  Visitors’ amenities in public museums are poorly developed. Little attention is
paid to museum shops, restaurants and cafeterias.11
Private Museums
Directors of private museums have a strong incentive to increase the income of the museum.
Their survival depends on sources of money like entrance fees, the restaurant, shop surpluses
and additional money from sponsors and donors. If private museums generate a surplus, they
are able to use it for future undertakings. As a result, it is to be expected that:
-  The museum managers rely on the market for their collection. Museums actively
sell paintings that no longer fit into the collection and use the money to buy new
works of art.
-  Private museums are much concerned with attracting visitors. ‘Blockbuster’
exhibitions enable museums to earn revenue, as the preferences of a broad group
of people are taken into account. The exhibitions are better arranged from a
didactic point of view and are appealingly presented.
-  Private  museums  emphasise  visitors’  amenities.  The  museum  shop  and  the
restaurants take up considerable space and are attractive.
Museum dependent on donations
In many countries, contributions to non-profit museums are deductible under the income tax
rules for individuals and corporations. A lower marginal tax rate reduces the willingness to
donate because the implicit cost of doing so rises. The tax-deductible status strongly affects
the behaviour of museum managers. In particular, they have an incentive to avoid profits by
charging low or ‘social’ prices which strengthens the legitimacy of tax-deductible status.
The directors devote much effort and skilled resources to make their museum attractive to
prospective donors. As a result, donors directly and indirectly exercise some measure of
control over the activities of museums:
-  Donors directly influence museum policy in two ways: they can either interfere in
the programming or they can set legally binding limitations on the collections they
donate. These limitations can much constrain the management. Most donors want
to highlight their own artistic visions. Many of them are pleased when museums
publicise their contribution, thus enhancing their prestige in the museum world.
Museums  have  developed  an  elaborated  system  of  honours  ranging  from
appropriate attributes (‘benefactor’, ‘patron’, ‘contributor’, etc.), to naming rooms,
wings and even whole buildings after their donors.
-  The indirect influence of donors works through impression management. The12
museums directors must show that donations are well used. Donors want to feel
that they contribute to a worthwhile cause. A good reputation of the art institution
with the public and the media is crucial for the flow of donations.
This discussion shows that an analysis of museums inspired by Neoclassics is able to derive
testable hypotheses and empirically relevant results. Nevertheless, there is much scope for
analyses  taking  into  account  the  concerns  for  social  values and social  relationships
emphasized by Social Economist. I see three areas in which they may be directly relevant:
(1) Few museum directors are mainly or even exclusively interested in their own utility.
The cultural world is characterized by persons with a strong intrinsic motivation, i.e.
with individuals who are fascinated by the work of collecting, saving and exhibiting
artefacts and works of art. This intrinsic motivation may lead them to act at least partly
in a pro-social way.
(2) People engaged in the arts often have strong political ideologies and see cultural
policy affected by the distribution of power. They see it as one of their tasks to fight
against  what  they  see  to  be  “the  bourgeoisie”.  They  therefore  oppose  many
suggestions to raise efficiency made by Neoclassics because they (rightly or wrongly)
believe that they violate the principles of equity. A case in point is raising entry prices
often proposed by Neoclassics
8. Such a policy may raise revenue as the price elasticity
of demand has generally been estimated to be below one. But higher entry prices may
conflict with equity and ethical principles, and may even affect human dignity, as the
population’s possibilities to partake in culture is affected.
(3) People working in the cultural sector are strongly embedded in a community. The
Neoclassical analysis of museums acknowledges that the reference group is important
for museum directors but they are ill equipped to go any deeper. It is left open who the
reference group exactly is and how quickly the identification with the reference group
changes when a person moves upward in his or her career.
V.  Conclusion
I have argued that economics understood as Neoclassics has much to contribute to our
understanding of institutions. I have tried to demonstrate such contributions for political
                                                   
8 See Lampi and Orth (2009).13
economics  (politico-economic  models  and  a  new  type  of  federalism)  and  for  the
economics of art (for the case of museums). The adherence to clearly defined individual
utility functions (selfishness and rationality) and clearly defined constraints allows
researchers to derive propositions often successfully empirically tested. The strength of
the Neoclassical analysis becomes most clearly apparent when it comes to the comparison
of institutions. Differences in behaviour can be explained when different types of
institutions are set against each other. Such an approach does not only provide interesting
insights but also has immediate relevance for policy.
But Neoclassics has considerable shortcomings. My contribution endeavours to point out
concretely  what  fruitful  contributions  Social  Economics  can  make  for  the  case  of
government behaviour, new types of federalism, and museums. I thus argue for a
multiplicity of approaches where both Neoclassics and Social Economics, as well as the
New Institutional and Psychological Economics have their particular roles. I am aware
that such a multiplicity of approaches is unpopular and therefore has little chance of being
of substantial importance in the future. Neoclassics is the clearly dominant paradigm
today
9 - and accordingly its believers tend to disregard, and sometimes arrogantly reject,
all other approaches. The situation of Social Economics is much different: its adherents
consider themselves to be a minority and tend to isolate themselves leading to an
unfortunate tendency to not seriously consider contributions by Neoclassics. In my view,
Social Economists sometimes reject Neoclassical analyses too early and in a too general
way
10. While this is understandable, it robs Social Economics the chance to influence
Neoclassical analysis – something I think is highly desirable.
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